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Abstract
It is recognized that security verication of cryptographic protocols tends to be dicult
and in fact, some aws on protocol designs or security proofs were found after they had been
presented. The use of formal methods is a way to deal with such complexity. Especially,
process calculi are suitable to describe parallel systems. Bisimilarity, which denotes that
two processes behave indistinguishably from the outside, is a key notion in process calculi.
However, by-hand verication of bisimilarity is often tedious when the processes have many
long branches in their transitions. We developed a software tool to automatically verify
bisimulation relation in a quantum process calculus qCCS and applied it to Shor and
Preskill's security proof of BB84. The tool succeeds to verify the equivalence of BB84 and
an EDP-based protocol, which are discussed in their proof.
1 Introduction
Security proofs of cryptographic protocols tend to be complex and dicult to verify. This
fact has been recognized in the classical cryptography and there is a line of researches to deal
with the complexity of verication [1, 2]. Since by-hand proofs are prone to human error and
time consumption, eorts have been put into automating security proofs and verication in the
classical cryptography. Security proofs are also complex in the quantum cryptography, where we
must also consider attacks using entanglements. The rst security proof of BB84 quantum key
distribution (QKD) protocol by Mayers [3] is about 50 pages long. After that paper, researchers
have been seeking simpler proofs [4, 5]. Since QKD is one of the closest application to practice
in the quantum information eld, it is important to examine QKD systems' security formally
and make it machine-checkable.
There are several formal frameworks for quantum protocols. Feng et al. developed a process
calculus qCCS [6]. In this calculus, a protocol is formalized as a conguration. A conguration
is a pair of a process and a quantum state corresponding to quantum variables. Weak open
bisimulation relation on qCCS congurations is dened. Weakly open bisimilar congurations
have the same transitions up to internal ones and reveal the identical quantum states to the
outsider (adversary) in each step. The relation is proven to be closed by parallel composition of
processes. A use case of a process calculus for formal verication is to prove weak bisimilarity
of implementation and specication described as congurations. qCCS has been applied to
quantum teleportation, superdense coding and BB84 protocols.
To extend application of formal methods to security proofs, we applied qCCS to Shor and
Preskill's security proof of BB84 [4] in the previous paper [7]. In Shor and Preskill's security
proof, security of BB84 is proven to be equivalent to that of another protocol based on an
entanglement distillation protocol (EDP), and then the latter is proven to be secure. We
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formalized BB84 and the EDP-based protocol as congurations and proved their bisimilarity
by hand. However, by-hand verication of bisimilarity is often tedious when congurations
have many long branches in their transitions. In this paper, we present a software tool to verify
bisimilarity of given two qCCS congurations. There are two main contributions of our work.
First, we implemented a software tool that formally veries bisimilarity of qCCS congu-
rations without recursive structures. A protocol possibly takes security parameters for various
purposes. As for BB84, it takes two parameters: one determines the length of qubits which
Alice sends to Bob in the rst quantum communication, and the other is for tolerated error-rate
in the eavesdropping detection step. Such parameters are passed to the verier as symbols and
are interpreted appropriately. In our verier's framework, quantum states and operations are
described as symbols. Since attacks from the adversary are also treated as symbols, our verier
can deal with unspecied attacks. To examine the behavioural equivalence, adversary's views
denoted by partial traces must be checked to be equal in each step of a protocol. The verier
automatically checks the equality using user-dened equations.
Second, we applied our verier to Shor and Preskill's security proof of BB84 [4]. The verier
takes as input two congurations denoting BB84 and the EDP-based protocol, and equations
about the properties of error-correcting codes and measurement of the halves of EPR pairs.
The verier succeeds to verify the bisimilarity of the congurations of the two protocols.
The package of the verier is available from http://hagi.is.s.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~tk/qccs
verifier.tar.gz. It includes a user manual and and example scripts in the folders doc and
scripts.
Related Work The authors of qCCS presented the notion of symbolic bisimulation for quan-
tum processes [8]. A purpose is to verify bisimilarity algorithmically. They proved the strong
(internal actions should be simulated) symbolic bisimilarity is equivalent to the strong open
bisimilarity, and actually presented an algorithm to verify symbolic ground (outsiders do not
perform quantum operations adaptively) bisimilarity. Since our purpose is to apply a pro-
cess calculus to security proofs where adversarial interference must be taken into account, we
implemented a tool that veries weak open bisimilarity on the basis of the original qCCS [6].
2 The Verier
Formal Framework The verier employs a sublanguage of qCCS, where the syntax of recur-
sion and the use of classical data are restricted. The framework is still expressive, because our
target protocols do not need recursion and classical probability distributions can be represented
as quantum states denoted by diagonal operators. The syntax of the processes in the verier is
as follows.
P ::= discard(~ q) j c?q:P j c!q:P j meas b then P saem j op[~ q]:P j PjjP j PnL
Intuitively, discard(~ q) means termination of a process keeping a sequence of quantum variables
~ q secret. c!q:P sends a quantum variable q to a channel c and then executes P. c?q:P receives
quantum data to a variable q from a channel c and then executes P. meas b then P saem
measures a quantum bit b and executes P if the outcome is 0 or terminates if the outcome is
1. op[~ q]:P performs a superoperator op to quantum variables ~ q and then executes P. PjjP0
executes P and P0 in parallel. PnL, where L is a set of channels, executes P keeping channels
in L private. Let qv(P) be the set of quantum variables that occur in a process P. c!q:P,
meas b then P saem, op[~ q]:P and PjjP0 are dened only if q = 2 qv(P), b 2 qv(P), ~ q  qv(P)
and qv(P) \ qv(P0) = ; respectively. In our verier, each quantum variable is dened with its
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qubit-length that is indicated by a natural number symbol declared beforehand. The adoption
of natural number symbols is important to treat security parameters in the verier. Quantum
states are represented as character strings called environments. The syntax of the environments
is given as follows.
 ::= X[~ q] j op[~ q]() j * j proji[b]() j Tr[~ q]()
Let qv() be the set of quantum variables that occur in an environment . X[~ q] means
that quantum variables ~ q are in a quantum state X. op[~ q]() is a quantum state after the
application of operation op to quantum variables ~ q in an environment .  * 0 represents the
tensor product of  and 0 but *0 and 0 * are identied in the verier. *0 is dened
only if qv() \ qv(0) = ;. proji[b]() means the reduced density operator jiihijbjiihijb with
i 2 f0;1g. Tr[~ q]() means the partial trace of  by ~ q. We call a pair hP;i of a process P
and an environment  a conguration only if qv(P)  qv(), because quantum states of qubits
occurring in P must be dened in . For example, an agent that sends the halves of n EPR pairs
to the outside is formalized as a conguration hc!q.discard(r);EPR[q,r]*ANY[s]i, where the
quantum variables q;r are of the qubit length n and the quantum variable s is dened with an
arbitrary qubit-length. EPR[q,r] is interpreted to (j00ih00j + j00ih11j + j11ih00j + j11ih11j)
n
q;r
and ANY[s] is arbitrarily for adversary's density operators.
A labelled transition system based on the original one [6] is implemented in the verier.
Transitions are interpreted as interactions between congurations and the adversary. For exam-
ple, the conguration above performs a transition hc!q.discard(r);EPR[q,r]*ANY[s]i
c!q
    !
hdiscard(r);EPR[q,r]*ANY[s]i, where the adversary can recognize that the quantum vari-
able q is sent through the channel c. Transitions caused by internal actions such as quantum
operations, internal communications and conditional branches are labelled . The label  intu-
itively means that the action is invisible from the outside. The transition rules of conditional
branch are hmeas b then P saem;i
   ! hP;proj0[b]()i and hmeas b then P saem;i
   !
hdiscard(qv(P));proj1[b]()i. These may decrease the trace of the density operator de-
noting a quantum state. Since the trace indicates the probability to reach to a conguration,
we can restore the probability from congurations to conditional branches. We identify the
branches that are evoked by an identical quantum variable. Eventually, probability is absorbed
in quantum states and excluded from the transition system.
The transition system of the original qCCS is probabilistic, which is caused by the mea-
surement construction M[q;x] in the syntax [6]. It measures an observable M of a quantum
variable q and stores the result in a classical variable x. There are two ways to formalize quan-
tum measurement since one can be also formalized as a superoperator. Because only M[q;x]
evokes a probabilistic branch, processes with dierent formalization of measurement are not
bisimilar in general. We proposed a criteria how to select the way in our previous work [7]; we
should use M[q;x] if a process behaves dierently according to the measurement. For example,
the case where a process performs dierent labeled transitions is typical. Otherwise, we should
formalize measurement by a superoperator. In our verier's framework, M[q;x] cannot be writ-
ten independently. Instead, the syntax meas b then P saem is the composition of M[q;x] and
the conditional branch in the original qCCS. This restriction and the conditions on quantum
variables prevent the situation where two congurations with the dierent ways of formalization
of measurement are not bisimilar.
Procedure to Check Bisimulation Weak bisimulation relation [6] is dened on qCCS con-
gurations. Roughly speaking, weakly bisimilar congurations (1) perform identical labelled
transitions up to  transitions and (2) reveal identical density operators whatever operations the
adversary performs to her quantum variables. The adversary's view is denoted by the partial
66Automated Verication of Equivalence on Quantum Cryptographic Protocols Kubota et al.
trace Tr[~ q]() when the global quantum state is  and ~ q are the quantum variables that are
not revealed to the adversary. The verier takes as input two congurations and user-dened
equations on environments and returns true or false. It is designed to be sound with respect
to the original qCCS, that is, two congurations are bisimilar if the verier returns true with
them and some valid equations. This is because
^ Reqs = f(C;D)jThe verier returns true, given C;D;and eqs:g
is a bisimulation relation for all valid equations eqs. Precisely, ^ Reqs is converted accordingly
because meas b then P saem is decomposed to M[b;x] and a conditional branch, which performs
a two-step transition in the branch with x = 0. The recursive procedure to verify bisimilarity
is as follows. Since the transitions of the processes written in our sublanguage are nite, the
procedure always terminates.
1. The procedure takes as input two congurations hP0;0i, hQ0;0i and user-dened equa-
tions on environments.
2. If P0 and Q0 can perform any -transitions of superoperator applications, they are all
performed at this point. Let hP;i and hQ;i be the obtained congurations.
3. Whether qv(P) = qv(Q) is checked. If it does not hold, the procedure returns false.
4. Whether Tr[qv(P)]() = Tr[qv(Q)]() is checked with user-dened equations. The
procedure to check the equality of quantum states are described in the next subsection.
If it does not hold, the procedure returns false.
5. A new superoperator symbol E[qv()   qv(P)] that stands for an adversarial operation
is generated.
6. For each hP0;0i such that hP;E[qv()   qv(P)]()i
   ! hP0;0i, the procedure checks
whether there exists hQ0;0i such that hQ;E[qv()   qv(Q)]()i
   !
   !
   ! hQ0;0i and
the procedure returns true with the input hP0;0i and hQ0;0i. If there exists, it goes to
the next step 7. Otherwise, it returns false.
7. For each hQ0;0i such that hQ;E[qv()   qv(Q)]()i
   ! hQ0;0i, the procedure checks
whether there exists hP0;0i such that hP;E[qv()   qv(P)]()i
   !
   !
   ! hP0;0i and
the procedure returns true with the input hQ0;0i and hP0;0i. If there exists, it returns
true. Otherwise, it returns false.
The step 2 prominently reduces the search space. Indeed, hop1[~ q]:Pjjop2[~ r]:Q;i and
hPjjQ;F ~ r
op2(E ~ q
op1())i are bisimilar, and F ~ r
op2(E ~ q
op1()) = E ~ q
op1(F ~ r
op2()) holds because ~ q \ ~ r = ;
holds. Therefore, superoperators that can originally cause  transitions are disposed.
Equality Test of Quantum States To test the equality of given two environments, the verier
checks whether they are transformed to the same form. There are two kinds of transformations,
trace out and application of user-dened rules.
Partial trace is signicant to test the equality of quantum states. For example, two dierent
quantum states op1[q](X[q]*Y[r]*Z[s]) and op2[r](U[q]*V[r]*Z[s]) have the same par-
tial trace Z[s] under Tr[q,r] for arbitrary interpretation of the superoperators op1;op2 and
the quantum states X;Y;Z;U;V. The verier eliminates symbols of superoperators and quantum
states according to the partial trace rules below.
Tr[~ q](E[~ r]()) = Tr[~ q]() if ~ r  ~ q (1); Tr[~ q]() = Tr[~ r](Tr[~ s]()) if ~ q = ~ r [ ~ s (2);
Tr[~ q](E[~ r]()) = E[~ r](Tr[~ q]()) if ~ q \ ~ r = ; (3); Tr[~ q](  ~ q  ) =    (4):
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If ~ r  ~ q holds, Tr[~ q](E[~ r]()) is rewritten to Tr[~ q]() eliminating E[~ r] by the rule (1);
otherwise, by the rules (2) and (3), the trace-out symbol with quantum variables that are disjoint
to targets of superoperator goes inside of it's application. After eliminating superoperators,
quantum states are traced out by the rule (4).
If an objective quantum state has a part that matches to the left-hand side of a user-
dened equation, the part is rewritten to the right-hand side. To apply a user-dened
equation, the verier automatically solves commutativity of superoperators or partial traces
that are applied to disjoint sets of quantum variables. For example, if the objective
quantum state is Tr[q](hadamard[s] (EPR[q,r]*X[s])) and a user denes an equation
Tr[q](EPR[q,r])=Tr[q](PROB [q,r]) (E1), the application goes as follows.
Tr[q](hadamard[s](EPR[q,r]*X[s])) = hadamards[s](Tr[q](EPR[q,r]*X[s])) (by 5)
= hadamard[s](Tr[q](PROB[q,r]*X[s])) (by E1)
Since the trace-out rules may have become applicable after applications of user-dened rules,
the trace-out procedure is applied again. In each opportunity to test the equality of quantum
states, each user-dened equation is applied only once. This guarantees whatever rules a user
denes, the equality test terminates.
3 Application to Shor and Preskill's Security Proof
The two protocols BB84 and the EDP-based protocol [4] are formalized as qCCS congurations
on the basis of our previous work [7]. Readers can nd the script scripts/shor-preskill.scr
in the package. The interpretations of the symbols of the quantum states and the superoperators
that are used in the formalization are also included as doc/shor-preskill symbols.pdf.
On Channels As in general QKD protocols, three kinds of channels are used: public quantum
channels, private classical channels and public no-interpolate classical channels. Since the
syntax has channel restriction PnL, formalization of private channels is straightforward. Public
no-interpolate classical channels are realized by copying the data. If a quantum variable q where
a classical value is assigned is sent through a public no-interpolate channel c, this is formalized
as :::copy[q,Q].c!q.d!Q:::nf:::;c;:::g, where Q is a new quantum variable, a superoperator
copy copies the value of q to Q and d is a new non-restricted channel. q will securely sent
through the restricted channel c and an adversary obtains the same value accessing Q through
a public channel d. Note that the value of q can be copied because it is classical.
Equations for the Proof We dened 10 equations in the verier. Equations are interpreted
to those on density operators and proven correct. For example, the equation below tells the
verier that the halves of EPR pairs are indistinguishable from the uniform distribution. This
is used to check that the adversary's views are identical in the EDP-based protocol and BB84
before Alice in the EDP-based protocol measures her halves of the check qubits.
equation E7
Tr[q1_A](EPR[q1_A,q2_A]) = Tr[q1_A](PROB[q1_A,q2_A])
end
The user-dened rule above is interpreted to an equation trfq1 Ag(j00ih00j+j00ih11j+j11ih00j+
j11ih11j)

n
q1 A;q2 A = trfq1 Ag(j00ih00j+j11ih11j)

n
q1 A;q2 A. The other rules are related to CSS codes,
partial traces and measurement of quantum states. We obtained them by formalizing the
equality of quantum states that are discussed in the original proof [4].
It is actually natural to express quantum states as symbols with some equations in inputs. In
cryptographic protocols, the dimension of quantum states and superoperators cannot be xed
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as a certain number as they depend on security parameters. In addition, qubits going through
public channels are potentially interpolated by the adversary. Since arbitrary computation
by the adversary must be considered, it should be described as an unspecied superoperator.
Therefore, quantum states are dicult to be expressed as concrete matrices, which can be
numerically analyzed. Although quantum states are treated symbolically, automatic calculation
of partial traces is still possible focusing on occurrence of quantum variables in environments.
Experiment Result We ran the verier with the input of shor-preskill.scr. We used a
note PC with Intel Core i5 CPU M 460 @ 2.53GHz and 1GB memory. The transition tree of
the EDP-based protocol has 621 nodes and 165 paths, and that of BB84 has 588 nodes and 165
paths. The verier checked the bisimilarity of the two protocols in 15.98 seconds. The recursive
procedure was called 951 times.
4 Conclusions
We presented a software tool to check bisimulation of qCCS congurations and applied it to a
security proof of BB84 [4]. In security proofs, equivalence on protocols is often discussed. It
can be described as bisimulation relation but it is nearly impossible to check by hand if state
transitions of processes have many long branches. In addition, the equality of an adversary's
view between two protocols has to be checked in each step. An adversary's view is calculated
from a global quantum states, which is possibly denoted by a huge matrix. The verier does
exhausting parts of proofs of behavioral equivalence, namely, it checks the correspondence of
all state transitions up to invisible ones and an adversary's view up to equations. On the other
hand, a user only have to examine the correctness of formalization of protocols and validity
of equations that he denes. It could be dicult to nd all appropriate equations for a proof
immediately. The verier is also able to show environments and/or processes when the check
procedure returns false. With the information, a user can modify equations to input.
Future Work We plan to dene probabilistic bisimilarity, which denotes that congurations be-
have indistinguishably up to some probability. This will be helpful to prove \indistinguishability
up to negligible probability" of protocols. It is quite common argument in the cryptography.
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